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Costs in criminal cases: ridiculously
ultra vires?
M. B. Rodriguez Ferrere, University of Otago,
proposes revision of the Regulations
J
ustice Fogarty’s judgment on costs in Carruthers v Otago
Regional Council [2014] NZHC 2212 is the latest to
highlight the significant deficiencies in the Costs in
Criminal Cases Regulations 1987 and makes the case
for their urgent revision.
BACKGROUND
Carruthers involved proceedings against an Otago farmer
for digging a river bed and allowing his livestock to disturb
the bed in contravention of s 13(1)(b) of the Resource Man-
agement Act 1991 (RMA). In July 2012, Mr Carruthers was
convicted in the District Court on two charges of contraven-
ing s 13 and was fined $5,400. He appealed to the High
Court against these convictions, essentially arguing that the
stream was not a ‘river’ for the purposes of the RMA and
therefore his actions did not contravene s 13 of that Act.
In the High Court (Carruthers v Otago Regional Council
(2013) 17 ELRNZ 156), Fogarty J allowed Mr Carruthers’
appeal, holding that the stream was an ‘artificial water-
course’ and thus excluded from the RMA’s definition of
‘river’. Subsequently, Mr Carruthers applied to the Court for
an award of costs against the Otago Regional Council under
s 8 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (the Act).
In his subsequent judgment on costs, Justice Fogarty
accepted that the substantive proceedings and the appeal
“was a particularly complex application of the RMA” (at
[3]): the case involved experienced counsel, an unusual site
visit by the trial judge and several sophisticated issues of
mixed law and fact. Accordingly, under s 8(6) of the Act,
since the appeal involved a “difficult or important point of
law”, the Court had the power to award costs, and Fogarty J
favoured the exercise of that jurisdiction. This left only the
issue of quantum. Section 8(1) of the Act gives the Court the
discretion to “subject to any regulations made under this Act,
make such order as to costs as it thinks fit.” The problem, as
Fogarty J discovered, is that the Costs in Criminal Cases
Regulations 1987 (the Regulations) fixed costs at levels that
were no longer reflective of the actual costs in bringing an
appeal. As Fogarty J stated (at [12]):
The regulations were last updated in 1987. The amount
prescribed in respect of an appeal against conviction is
$240 and for appeal against sentence $136. These amounts
are now 27 years out of date. The sums for an appeal
against conviction is [sic] now ridiculous, measured against
the value of $240 in 2014 as compared to that sum in
1987.
A RIDICULOUS SITUATION
In fact, the levels are slightly worse than Fogarty J stated,
with Schedule 1 of the Regulations prescribing $226 for each
half day in Court in an appeal against conviction and $130
for appeals against sentence only. The levels are the same for
appearances at trial. Moreover, the Regulations have actu-
ally been amended twice since their promulgation in 1987.
The first amendment occurred a year later in 1988. Those
amendment regulations increased the levels of costs from the
original ($213 and $107 respectively) to what they are today;
they are instead only a mere 26 years out of date. What serves
to make the situation truly ridiculous is the second amend-
ment to the Regulations, which occurred in 2013 and 25
years after the first amendment. Those amendment regula-
tions were a consequence of the changes in procedure caused
by the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. This amendment pro-
vided an ideal opportunity to revisit the levels of costs, but it
was not an opportunity seized. As per the explanatory note
that accompanied the Costs in Criminal Cases Amendment
Regulations 2013, the amendments were simply to harmonise
procedure, and “[t]here is no change in the amounts payable
as fees.”
The reason the levels have not increased in 26 years is
unclear, but Fogarty J is certainly not alone in his criticism. In
2000, the Law Commission issued a report on Costs in
Criminal Cases (NZLC R60). The Commission noted that
there “has been frequent judicial criticism that the scale is
unrealistic to cover the actual costs incurred by defendants”
(at 28). This led to a recommendation, at 2, that:
There should continue to be a scale of costs under section
13, but it should be modelled on the new civil rules costs
structure, which would provide adequately for prepara-
tion costs, and be updated regularly.
The Commission’s recommendation was never followed.
Since the 2000 report, the judicial criticism to which it
alludes has only increased in frequency and ferocity. The
Court of Appeal in Page v Page [2008] NZCA 80 noted,
at [25], that as:
… has been remarked on a number of occasions over the
years, the scale of costs appearing in the Regulations has
long since been well overtaken by inflation and other
factors and requires to be substantially increased … before
it could represent what is “just and reasonable” in the
circumstances of most cases.
As the Court of Appeal noted, the District Court in the same
proceedings was slightly more forthright, referring to the
scale as “abysmally low” (at [12]).
The severity of the situation is clear once contrasted with
the applicable scale in civil proceedings mandated by the
High Court Rules, which were — for further contrast —
recently updated in 2012. Category 1 proceedings, namely
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those “of a straightforward nature able to be conducted by
counsel considered junior in the High Court” (r 14.3(1)) are
afforded a daily recovery rate of $1,320. Category 3 proceed-
ings — those requiring counsel with special skill and exper-
tise — are afforded a rate of $2,940. In Carruthers, the
appellant retained Colin Withnall QC, one of New Zealand’s
most experienced barristers who, incidentally, took silk in
1988, the same year as the Regulations were last amended.
From Fogarty J’s judgment, it is clear his expertise and
experience was necessary given the significant complexity of
the issues involved; the proceedings might have been cat-
egory 3 in the Court’s civil jurisdiction. However, since they
were instead in the Court’s criminal jurisdiction, the appel-
lant could only recover costs at 15 per cent of that rate.
Obviously, the rationale behind costs in civil proceedings
is vastly different from that in criminal proceedings. This is
highlighted by the High Court Rules’ principle that the
unsuccessful party pays the costs of the successful party
(r 14.2(a)) in contrast to the Act’s explicit statement that
there is no presumption for or against awarding a successful
defendant costs (s 5(3)). Awarding costs to successful defen-
dants in criminal proceedings is a significantly more vexed
question than in civil proceedings, if for no other reason than
difference in evidential burdens means that success is more
difficult in the former. However, the Act recognises this issue
and accordingly makes clear that “no defendant shall be
granted costs…by reason only of the fact that he has been
acquitted” (s 5(4)). The decision to grant costs to a successful
defendant is entirely discretionary, and a defendant is obliged
to provide good reasons why the Court should exercise that
discretion in his or her favour. To this extent, the Act com-
pensates for the different factors at play when awarding costs
in criminal proceedings, such that the disparity between the
levels remains unjustified and not explained by those differ-
ent factors. In any case, as discussed below, the Court does
not appear to see that difference as an insurmountable bar-
rier to making an analogy. Moreover, from a different per-
spective, if the increase of the 1988 amendment regulations
— $13 per half day — was continued year on year, the
amount specified in the Regulations would now be $564 per
half day, and thus similar to that of category 1 proceedings,
showing that that current rate is deficient regardless of the
benchmark adopted.
FORCING THE COURT’S HAND
The Court is not completely restricted to the scale set by the
Regulations; s 13(3) of the Act allows the Court to make an
order for costs in excess of that scale when satisfied that the
case is especially difficult, complex or important. It seems
that frequently, however, the inadequacy of the scale costs
provided by the Regulations forces the Court’s hand to
invoke s 13(3) in situations where those criteria are not
necessarily met. The Law Commission found that in the 22
cases between 1996 and 2000 where defendants were suc-
cessful in applying for costs against the Crown, 18 of the
awards were in excess of scale (at 17). It seems contrary to
the rationale of the s 13(3) exception that 80 per cent of cases
were of special difficulty, complexity or importance. Instead
it seems more likely that the Court instead uses 13(3) as a
way of avoiding the injustice of applying anachronistic regu-
lations.
In Carruthers, Fogarty J invoked s 13(3) to grant costs in
excess of scale, although given the complexity of the issues
involved, this was arguably exactly the type of proceedings
envisaged by that exception. In determining the appropriate
quantum, any distinction between the rationale for costs in
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings — as detailed
above — was ignored. Mr Withnall QC argued that two-
thirds of the defendant’s actual costs was an appropriate
amount, that being the “theoretical benchmark” of costs in
civil proceedings (at [15]). Justice Fogarty agreed to an
extent, holding that “[t]hese proceedings under the RMA are
similar to civil proceedings, less so to ordinary criminal
proceedings” and “[w]ithout directly applying the two-
thirds rule”, he awarded the defendant $4000: well in excess
of the scale provided by the Regulations (at [16]–[17]).
Might the state of the Regulations force the Court’s hand
in another way? The importance of Carruthers is that for the
first time the Court questioned the validity of the Regulations
directly. Justice Fogarty states, at [12], that: “Regulations
could not be made today in these amounts. They would be
ultra vires.” If this is the case, the question becomes whether
the scale provided by Regulations can or should retain its
validity despite its increasing obsolescence.
Generally, the Court may invalidate delegated legislation
(such as regulations) for several reasons, including that it is:
beyond the scope of its empowering provision; repugnant to
other primary legislation; too uncertain; or is unreasonable:
Conley v Hamilton City Council [2008] 1 NZLR 789 (CA)
at [45]. When applying these criteria to the Regulations it is
unclear whether Fogarty J was correct in his supposition that
they would be ultra vires if enacted today. The empowering
provision — s 13 of the Act — states that regulations may be
made for the purpose of “prescribing the heads of costs”
(s 13(1)(a)) and the “maximum scales of costs” (s 13(1)(b))
that can be awarded. This empowering provision does not
indicate that that these regulations must prescribe scales of
costs that are fair or accurate and nor does the Act itself
indicate that this is one of its purposes; simply that it will
prescribe amounts. This means that as they currently stand,
the Regulations appear to fall within the four corners of their
empowering provision. Moreover, the Regulations appear to
be sufficiently certain and do not undermine other statutes
such that they are repugnant to primary legislation. The
inadequacy of the levels the Regulations prescribe might lead
one to conclude they are unreasonable, but the test for
unreasonableness is that regulations are “beyond the limits
of reason”: Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1987]
2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 131. Whilst clearly inadequate and
perhaps ridiculous, it is unlikely that the Regulations and the
amounts they prescribe are beyond the limits of reason:
simple disagreement with the scale, even if widespread, fre-
quent and vehement, is insufficient to meet the threshold of
this criterion.
Assuming for the moment, however, that the Regulations
— if enacted today with the same amounts — would be ultra
vires, a more significant problem is that given the amounts
they prescribe were sufficient in 1987, they were clearly intra
vires when they were first promulgated. That likely means
there is little the Court can do with them today, since there is
no apparent authority for the proposition that a Court has
the ability to invalidate delegated legislation that has become
ultra vires simply through the passage of time. The Court’s
supervisory power over delegated legislation focuses on its
promulgation; the executive’s action in using legislative power
delegated to it by Parliament. This means that once promul-
gated validly, delegated legislation ought to retain its validity
ad infinitum. Accordingly, the Court does not appear to have
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the power to attack the Regulations directly, which is per-
haps why all it has done thus far is complain.
A POTENTIAL AVENUE FOR REDRESS
The inability of the Court to review or amend validly pro-
mulgated delegated legislation is not the end of the matter.
Where the Court lacks this power, Parliament possesses it,
and its Regulatory Review Committee would be the appro-
priate body to review the Regulations and determine whether
they are still fit for purpose. Under Parliament’s Standing
Orders, the Committee can hear complaints about existing
regulations on a number of grounds, including that they are
“not in accordance with the general objects and intentions of
the [empowering] statute” (SO319(2)(a)). This is a broader
test than that which the Court adopts to determine whether
delegated legislation was validly promulgated, and allows
the Committee to question whether the general intention of
the Act was to allow the amounts to remain so low such that
they are now commonly derided. The Committee can then
report to the House and make non-binding recommenda-
tions to Government if it concluded that revision is necessary.
Justice Fogarty’s decision in Carruthers simply adds another
voice to the chorus voicing dissatisfaction with regulations
that have been left fallow for 26 years. Whilst it is unlikely
that the Court could invalidate the Regulations directly, this
does not in any way detract from the fact that they are
currently unacceptable, and need to be revised as soon as
possible to reduce their unfairness, injustice and ridiculous-
ness. ❒
Continued from page 40
As W and other scenario technique examples demonstrate,
however, significant pressure can be created outside of cus-
tody. Given that the decision to detain is a police one and
(subject to funds) is not necessary if the equivalent of an
interrogation can be completed in a non-custodial setting,
this would seem an odd distinction to make. Such improper
conduct can be avoided if undercover questioning is limited
in whatever setting to an essentially investigative purpose. In
those circumstances any confession would have the appear-
ance of being essentially voluntary.
This distinction may be possible to draw under the current
law explicitly in rights terms. In R v Allen (HC Rotorua
CRI-2007-087-1729, 10 February 2009) the High Court
observed that while the NZBORA does not explicitly recognise
a common law right to silence, s 28 of the NZBORA recognises
that existing rights or freedoms shall not be held to be
abrogated or restricted by reason of non-inclusion in the
NZBORA and accordingly a broader right to silence can
co-exist with the statutory right. Even if it must continue to
be done under an “unfairness” rubric, right to silence con-
siderations provide a powerful reason that the decision in W
should not be limited.
In hearing the appeal in W the Supreme Court is likely to
deal with several features of the scenario technique which
may cause concern apart from the right to silence. Whether
strictly cognisable as legal objections, a number of features of
the technique might be of interest to the public, such as the
significant police resources deployed in such operations,
factors concerning state use of psychological pressure and
the potentially lasting effect on the life trajectory of a con-
ceivably innocent person.
It should be noted, however, that there is a High Court
order in the W proceedings under s 205 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 2011 for suppression of evidence and submis-
sions,althoughtheearlierdecision inRvCameron [2009]NZCA
87 appears to be publicly available and does not appear to be
suppressed. In Canada the use of the scenario technique is
public knowledge and subject to public discussion. ❒
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